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A NEW LOOK AT SUNDAY CLOSING LEGISLATION
I.

INTRODUCTION

The Supreme Court of the United States has held that Sunday
closing laws do not violate the first amendment, whether or not
they contain exemptions for Sabbatarians (those who keep Saturday holy). The Court said that it is within the state police power to
provide a day of uniform rest, and that this purpose is secular and
not religious even if the chosen day is Sunday. For this reason, in
McGowan v. Maryland1 the Court held that such a law did not violate the establishment clause. In Braunfeld v. Brown2 the Court
held that Sunday closing laws do not infringe upon Sabbatarians'
free exercise of religion. The reasoning in Braunfeld was that
Sunday closing laws do not exert direct pressure on the beliefs of
Sabbatarians,
but only economic pressure which alone is insuffi3
cient.
In Sherbert v. Verner4 the appellant, a Seventh-Day Adventist, was unable to find employment because her religion forbade
her to work on Saturday. She applied for and was refused unemployment compensation from the State of South Carolina, on the
ground that her unemployment was without "good cause" as set
out in the unemployment act. The Supreme Court held that the
refusal under the circumstances abridged the appellant's right to
the free exercise of her religion secured by the first amendment.
Although Sherbert is not a Sunday closing law case, it involves,
like McGowan and Braunfeld, state action causing economic hardship to Sabbatarians. Braunfeld was distinguished by the Supreme
Court on the basis that the state interest in creating Sunday closing
1 366 U.S. 420 (1961). The appellants were employees of a highway
department store, and were convicted of selling articles in violation
of MD. ANN. CoDE art. 27, § 521 (1957), which is a typical Sunday
closing law that also exempted certain commodities as well as retail
establishments employing not more than one person in addition to the
owner. The United States Supreme Court held that the law did not
violate (1) the establishment clause of the first amendment or (2) the
equal protection or due process clauses of the fourteenth amendment.
2 366 U.S. 599 (1961).
The appellants were Orthodox Jews, engaged in
the retail sale of clothing which was prohibited from sale on Sunday
by a Pennsylvania criminal statute. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4699.10
(1963). The United States Supreme Court held in part that the law
as it affected the appellants did not violate their right to the free
exercise of religion under the first amendment.
8 The term "direct" as used by the Supreme Court and in this article
means a direct burden on belief, as opposed to a burden on economic
well-being, which the Supreme Court terms as being "indirect."
4 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
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laws is greater and the pressure on Sabbatarians' beliefs is "less
direct" than in Sherbert.5 The Supreme Court did not explain why
the state interest in creating a day of uniform rest is so strong, nor
did it provide a standard for determining what degree of pressure is
sufficient to fall within the ban of the first amendment.
These uncertainties have resulted in two cases, Terry Carpenter, Inc. v. Wood 6 and Skag-Way Dep't Stores, Inc. v. City of
Omaha7 in which the Supreme Court of Nebraska came to the
conclusion that Sunday closing legislation is a tool for religious as
well as commercial discrimination, and therefore, on the balance,
is not so important to the welfare of the state as the statutes upheld
by the United States Supreme Court. The purpose of this comment
is to attempt to explain how Nebraska reached this position in
light of the interpretations of Sunday closing laws in McGowan,
Braunfeld and Sherbert.
II. McGOWAN AND BRAUNFELD
McGowan and Braunfeld taken together hold that if the legislative purpose of enacting a Sunday closing law is not to advance a
particular religious sect or to adversely effect Sabbatarians, then
the law does not violate the first amendment, even though the law
has both these effects in economic terms.
In McGowan the appellant's arguments against Sunday closing
laws under the establishment clause are found in the majority opinion as follows:
Sunday is the Sabbath day of the predominant Christian sects;
...the purpose of the enforced stoppage of labor on that day is
to facilitate and encourage church attendance; . .. the purpose of
setting Sunday as a day of universal rest is to induce people with
no religion . . . to join the predominant Christian sects; . . . the
purpose of the atmosphere of tranquility created by Sunday closing
is to aid the conduct of church services and religious observance
of the sacred day.8
The appellant in addition demonstrated the Christian origin of the
laws, as well as language to that effect in the statute. 9 The Supreme Court did not agree that the purpose of Sunday closing
5 See note 20 infra.
6 177 Neb. 515, 129 N.W.2d 475 (1964). See text accompanying notes
23-30 infra.
7 179 Neb. 707, 140 N.W.2d 28 (1966).
See text accompanying notes
48-58 infra.
8 McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 431 (1961).
9 Id. at 431-34.

COMMENTS
laws was religious:
[T]he State's purpose is not merely to provide a one-day-in-seven
work stoppage. In addition to this, the State seeks to set one day
apart from all others as a day of rest, repose, recreation and tranquility-a day which all members of the family and community
have the opportunity to spend and enjoy together, a day on which
there exists relative quiet and disassociation from the everyday
intensity of commercial activities, a day on which people may visit
friends and relatives who are not available during working days.' 0
The Court recognized that the appellant in McGowan suffered
an immediate economic loss as a result of Sunday closing laws."
Nevertheless, the Court held that regardless of economic injury,
the purpose in contemporary society of Sunday closing laws is secular, and if a state chooses Sunday as the day of uniform rest, the
coincidence with the religious tenets of the Christian faith does not
result in the violation of the establishment clause.
In BraunfeZd, a member of the Jewish faith suffered an economic loss. But in the opinion of the Court, the resulting coercion to
work on Saturday in order to compete economically with non-Sabbatarians was only an "indirect" pressure on a Sabbatarian's free
exercise of religion. 2 There must be a "direct" pressure on religious beliefs
and exercise before a violation of the first amendment
3
1

occurs.
10

Id. at 450.

(Footnote omitted.)
It is interesting to compare the holding in McGowan with
the following language taken from Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1961):
"The Establishment Clause, unlike the Free Exercise Clause, does not
depend upon any showing of direct governmental compulsion and is
violated by the enactment of laws which establish an official religion
whether those laws operate directly to coerce nonobserving individuals
or not. Id. at 430. (Emphasis added.)
Canada, which does not have a law comparable to the establishment clause in the Constitution of the United States, has also entertained litigation over Sunday dosing laws. It is interesting to note
that the Canadian courts concede that the Sunday laws are religious
laws, contrary to the result reached in McGowan. For an interesting
discussion on the Canadian position, see Barron, Sunday in North
America, 79 HARv. L. REV. 42 (1965).
"The distinction between the two clauses in apparent--a violation of
the Free Exercise Clause is predicated on coercion while the Establishment Clause violation need not be so attended." Abington School Dist.
v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 223 (1963).
"Of course, to hold unassailable all legislation regulating conduct which
imposes solely an indirect burden on the observance of religion would
be a gross oversimplification ....
But if the State regulates conduct
by enacting a general law ... which is to advance the State's secular
goals, the statute is valid despite its indirect burden on religious
observance unless the State may accomplish its purpose by means

11 Id. at 453.

12

13
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The rationale laid down by the Supreme Court in McGowan
and Braunfeld has not proved to be workable. This is made clear,
for example, by an attempt of the Florida legislature under the
holdings of Braunfeld and McGowan to provide for mandatory
Bible reading in public schools. The statute stated that its purpose was purely secular-the instillation of a higher sense of morality among school children. The statute was initially upheld by the
state supreme court in Chamberlain v. Dade County Bd. of Pub.
Instruction.14 The court said that guidelines were completely lacking since McGowan and Braunfeld.15 The Supreme Court of the
United States reversed without opinion. 16
Another case which illustrates the lack of definitive guidelines in McGowan and Braunfeld is State ex rel. Hecks, Inc. v.
Gates.17 In this case, a Sunday closing law contained a Sabbatarian exemption. It was attacked by a Moslem whose day of worship was Friday, on the grounds that the law violated the first
amendment. The state court upheld the statute, citing McGowan
which do not impose such a burden."
599, 607 (1961).
14

Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S.

160 So. 2d 97 (Fla. 1964), rev'd and remanded, 377 U.S. 402 (1964),

rev'd, 171 So. 2d 535 (Fla. 1965).
15 "It is our conclusion that the statute was founded upon secular rather
than sectarian considerations and is to be construed as was the Sunday
Closing Law in the McGowan case ....
The accommodation of religious beliefs is secondary to the intent of the Legislators ....
[W]e
do not feel that the privilege, or duty, is ours to speculate the extent to
which the Supreme Court of the United States intended to expand its
philosophy. We have, without avail, endeavored to find, in the diverse
views expressed by the several Justices of the United States Supreme
Court who participated in these decisions, a clear course for us to
follow." Id. at 99. (Footnote omitted.)
16 Chamberlain v. Dade County Bd. of Pub. Instruction, 377 U.S. 402
(1964).
17 149 W. Va. 421, 141 S.E.2d 369 (1965).
"[T]his Court holds that the
failure of the statute to provide an exemption for persons of the Druse
or Moslem faith or any other faith, whose members conscientiously
observe Friday as the Sabbath, even though it provides such exemption for members of a faith which observes Saturday as a Sabbath,
does not violate the provisions of the First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States or prohibit the free exercise of religion
of any of the petitioners. . . ." Id. at 445, 141 S.E.2d at 385. "State
legislatures are presumed to have acted within their constitutional
power despite the fact that, in practice, their laws result in some
inequality." Id. at 448, 141 S.E.2d at 386. The court held that none of
the classifications violated the "invidious discrimination" test. Id. at
448, 141 S.E.2d at 387. See note 18, infra, for a brief discussion of
"invidious discrimination" as the current equal protection standard.

COMMENTS
and Williamson v. Lee Optical Co.' s as authority. The Gates case
in effect allows the state to discriminate among religions. Unfortunately the Constitution has not been used to protect minority
religions with the same intensity under the equal protection clause
as it has protected minority racial groups. If a state once chooses to
make class distinctions among various religions for the purposes of
regulation, then its classifications are discriminatory when they confer a benefit on some religions and not on others. One would
think this explicit in the equal protection clause, and the fact that
the discrimination occurs with religious classifications, ought to be
sufficient to make the discrimination invidious within the meaning
of the current equal protection test. The first amendment as interpreted in Braunfeld falls far short of realizing the substantial interdependency between economics and the exercise of religion, and the
effect that one bears on the other. This is indicated by the very
nature of the direct-indirect test laid down in Braunfeld. But as it
stood after Braunfeld, neither the first amendment nor the equal
protection clause of the fourteenth amendment provide protection
against the situation in Gates.
III. SHERBERT V. VERNER
Sherbert v. Verner,19 contrary to Braunfeld, recognizes that
there is a cause and effect relationship between economic deprivation and the exercise of religion so as to produce a violation of the
free exercise clause. The majority in Sherbert attempted to distinguish Braunfeld as follows:
[T]he state interest asserted in the present case is wholly dissimilar to the interests which were found to justify the less direct
The Court
burden upon religious practices in Braunfeld. ...
recognized that the Sunday closing law which that decision sustained undoubtedly served 'to make the practice of [the Orthodox
Jewish merchants'] . . . religious beliefs more expensive,' 366 US,
at 605. But the statute was nevertheless saved by a countervailing
factor which finds no equivalent in the instant case-a strong state
interest in providing one uniform day of rest for all workers. That
secular objective could be achieved, the Court found, only by
declaring Sunday to be that day of rest. Requiring exemptions
for Sabbatarians, while theoretically possible, appeared to present
an administrative problem of such magnitude, or to afford the
exempted class so great a competitive advantage, that such a
348 U.S. 483 (1955). "Evils in the same field may be of different
dimensions and proportions, requiring different remedies. Or so the
The legislature may select one phase of
legislature may think ....
The
one field and apply a remedy there, neglecting the others ....
prohibition of the Equal Protection Clause goes no further than the
invidious discrimination." Id. at 489. (Emphasis added.)
19 374 U.S. 398 (1963). See note 4 supra, for a discussion of the facts.
18
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requirement 20would have rendered the entire statutory scheme
unworkable.
This language presents several important factors which merit further discussion.
First, the Court finds no difficulty in abandoning the direct-indirect test used in Braunfeld, and adopting a test based on the degrees of directness, as balanced against the strength of underlying
state interests. The Court for the first time recognized that economic pressure as a result of not being able to find a job could
exert enough pressure on a Sabbatarian to disregard that part of
her faith which asks her not to work on Saturday. Furthermore,
the Court recognized that the particular day of worship is an integral part of any religion, and is protected by the free exercise
clause from economic pressure. The Court also admitted that the
appellant in Braunfeld is made to have a more expensive religion
as an immediate consequence of Sunday closing laws. Then why
does the Court refuse to require Sabbatarian exemptions?
According to the Supreme Court, it is partly because the "strong
state interest" in providing Sunday as a day of rest would be destroyed by allowing Sabbatarian exemptions, because of administrative difficulties and because of the great competitive advantage
which would result to Sabbatarians. To require a Sabbatarian exemption would render the Sunday closing law "unworkable."
It is difficult to agree with the Court that "so great a competitive advantage" is a meritorious defense against Sabbatarian
exemptions. The other half of the argument is that Sunday worshipers now enjoy a great advantage over Sabbatarians who close
on Saturday for religious reasons. To allow Sabbatarians to open
their stores on Sunday while all others are closed admittedly gives
them an advantage of a monopoly on Sunday trade. But this objection has little meaning to a Sabbatarian who now is deprived completely of week-end trade because of his firmly held religious
beliefs.
The other argument given by the Court is that a Sabbatarian
exemption would pose administrative problems "since there would
be two or more days to police rather than one and it would be more
difficult to observe" 21 when violations occur. This does not square
20 Id. at 408-09.
(Emphasis added.) (Footnote omitted.) The only case
to apply Sherbert to a Sunday closing law is State v. Solomon, 245 S.C.
550, 141 S.E.2d 818 (1965), and the court in Solomon quoted at length
from this language in distinguishing Braunfeld from the Sunday closing
case before it. The United States Supreme Court dismissed the appeal.
Solomon v. South Carolina, 382 U.S. 204 (1965).

21

Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 608 (1961).

See note 23, infra.

COMENTS
with Justice Brennan's dissent in Braunfeld where he observed
that twenty-one out of thirty-four Sunday closing law states have
exemptions, and
We are not told that those States are significantly noisier, or that
their police are significantly more burdened.... Even England,
not under the compulsion of a written constitution, but simply
influenced by considerations
of fairness, has such an exemption for
22
some activities.
Another administrative difficulty that the Court suggests is that a
Sabbatarian exemption would require an undesired inquiry into
the sincerity of religious beliefs.23 What Justice Brennan said applies here also. This argument was rejected by the Supreme Court
in Sherbert. Furthermore, in In re Jenison24 the court held, in
accordance with Sherbert, that prospective jurors who refuse duty
because of a conflict with religious scruples cannot be prosecuted.
All that is necessary,
said the court, is an inquiry into the sincerity
25
of religious belief.
The Supreme Court distinguished Braunfeld from Sherbert
on the grounds that in Braunfeld a Sabbatarian exemption would
destroy the valid state interest in creating a uniform day of rest.
The reasons given to substantiate this are weak: 1) great competitive advantage to Sabbatarians, 2) policing difficulties, and 3)
problems in obtaining convictions of violators. Aside from these,
all that remains in the balance is the strength of the state interest
as opposed by the effect that Sunday closing laws have on the free
exercise of religion by Sabbatarians. At this point, the need for
standards and clarity become crucial, but here the Court is least
illuminating.
The Court said there was a less direct burden on religious practices in Braunfeld than in Sherbert. Applying this test necessarily
involves a determination of the degree of coercion which is forbid22

23

24

Id. at 614-15. Israel, incidentally, has an exemption for Christians, as
well as one for Moslems. Gilbert, Tenth Judicial Circuit Conference,
34 F.R.D. 29, 53 (1964).
Commercial noise, enforcement difficulties, economic advantages and
inquiry into religious convictions are given as reasons why a state may
prefer not to exempt Sabbatarians. Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599,
608-09 (1961).
267 Minn. 136, 125 N.W.2d 588 (1963), reversing 265 Minn. 96, 120 N.W.

2d 515 (1963) after the United States Supreme Court vacated and
remandedper curiam in light of Sherbert. 375 U.S. 14 (1963).
25 Regarding procedures relating to inquiries into the sincerity of religious beliefs, see United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965) involving
exemptions from military service because of religious training and
belief.
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den by the free exercise clause. In the past, however, this has not
proved workable. The two school release time cases reached opposite results only because in McCollum v. Board of Educ.,26 proof of
coercion was before the Court, and in Zorach v. Clauson2 7 the
proof was not admitted into evidence in the lower court. 28 In
Sherbert a third alternative was reached-the pressure on the appellant to forego a religious practice is "unmistakable. ' 20 The problem of proof of coercion, then, has not been smoothly handled by
the Supreme Court. Can it fairly be said as a matter of constitutional law that the pressure in Braunfeld is unmistakably less than
in Sherbert? If there is a standard on which the free exercise of
religion is made to turn, it should be one involving actual proof,
and which interjects an element of predictability. The Supreme
Court has not developed the standard as yet, nor did it attempt to
do so in Sherbert.
More important, perhaps, the Supreme Court has not spelled
out why the state interest in creating a day of uniform rest is so
strong as to allow a state to exert any pressure on Sabbatarians'
beliefs, regardless of how direct or indirect that pressure might be.
The purposes of Sunday closing legislation"0 apply equally to other
days of the week which would avoid a conflict of religious-economic
interests. Why Sunday? The Supreme Court obviously feels that
there is a particular advantage in Sunday; otherwise the "reason26

27

28

29
30

333 U.S. 203 (1948).

A public school was opened to Catholic, Protes-

tant and Jewish instructors who would teach their religions in the
classrooms of the school once a week. "Here not only are the State's
tax-supported public school buildings used for the dissemination of
religious doctrines. The State also affords sectarian groups an invaluable aid in that it helps to provide pupils for their religious classes
through use of the State's compulsory public school machinery. This
is not separation of Church and State." Id. at 212.
343 U.S. 306 (1952). This case is similar on its facts to McCollum,
except that the children were taught religion off school property. This
program was held not to violate the first amendment. "There is a
suggestion that the system involves the use of coercion to get public
school students into religious classrooms. There is no evidence in the
record before us that supports that conclusion." Id. at 311. (Footnote
omitted.)
"And though the courts below cited the concurring opinion in McCollum
. . . to 'emphasize the importance of detailed analysis of the facts to
which the Constitutional test of Separation is to be applied,' they
denied that opportunity on the ground that such proof was irrelevant
to the issue of constitutionality." Id. at 321-22 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
374 U.S. 398, 404 (1963).
See note 10 supra.

COMMENTS
able alternative" test suggested in Braunfeld3l would have been applied. The distinct advantages, no doubt, are tradition and uniformity. But when these "secular" interests alone are permitted
to overcome the spirit of the first amendment merely because only
the plight of religious
"indirect" injury arises from them, then
32
minorities in this country is grave indeed.
IV.

SUNDAY CLOSING LAWS IN NEBRASKA

These unresolved questions have partially contributed to two
recent Nebraska Supreme Court decisions which held Sunday closing laws invalid as a violation of the equal protection clause. The
two cases represent somewhat of an evolution, even though decided only a year apart. In the Wood 33 case, as will be seen, the
court was struggling for an understanding of Sunday closing laws
which would properly account for their inherent air of discrimination. In Skag-Way, 34 the court totally reappraised Sunday legislation in a modern commercial context. It concluded that Sunday
closing laws are a guise in the name of traditional state police
power to protect business interests, and, therefore are subject to
close scrutiny under the equal protection clause. As such, Sunday
31 See note 13 supra.
32 In
Sherbert, the Supreme

Court announced a somewhat different approach to the establishment clause than it had taken in McGowan.
Sherbert held that it is not "fostering the establishment" of the appellant's religion to require a state to pay her unemployment because
her religion made her refuse to accept work on Saturday. Sherbert
In the words of the Court:
v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 409 (1963).
"[T]he extension of unemployment benefits to Sabbatarians in common with Sunday worshippers reflects nothing more than the govern-

mental obligation of neutrality in the face of religious differences.. .. "
Ibid. (Emphasis added.) If a state has an "obligation of neutrality
in the face of religious differences," and such an obligation results in
recognizing and making a religious exception for Sabbatarians, then
the establishment clause has taken on an additional factor since the

McGowan case. The additional factor was commented upon by Jus-

33
34

tice Stewart, concurring in the result in the Sherbert case, when he
said: "Yet what this Court has said about the Establishment Clause
must inevitably lead to a diametrically opposite result" than that
which is reached in the Sherbert case. Id. at 414. Formerly, strict
neutra!ity imposed no such duty to accommodate the various factions
within the religious community. Sunday closing laws obviously do
not take into account the disposition of the religious community, unless
they contain Sabbatarian exemptions, and as discussed in connection
with the free exercise clause, the Supreme Court has not explained
why Sunday closing is of such compelling state interest.
Terry Carpenter, Inc. v. Wood, 177 Neb. 515, 129 N.W.2d 475 (1964).
Skag-Way Dep't Stores, Inc. v. City of Omaha, 179 Neb. 707, 140 N.W.
2d 28 (1966).
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closing laws no longer occupy a favored position, contrary to the
conclusion reached in Sherbert.
The Wood case illustrates a typical Sunday closing law violation. The plaintiff corporation sold a can of paint, a toy, two cans
of vegetables, one pair of hose and one can opener 35 in violation of
section 3 of the act,3 6 which enumerated items not to be sold on
Sunday. Section 4 did not exempt the plaintiff who employed
more than two persons.37 The plaintiff sought to enjoin enforcement of the act, basing its contentions on article 1, sections 138 and
339 of the Constitution of Nebraska, and the fourteenth amendment
to the Constitution of the United States. The plaintiff did not
contend that the act violated the first amendment, 40 and so the
Nebraska court was concerned only with the validity, under due
process, of the various classifications embraced in the act.
The court found that the state objective of promoting health,
peace and good order of society is not served by allowing retailers
with less than three employees to remain open on Sunday while
all others are made to close, allowing commercial recreational activities on Sunday and prohibiting the sale of other commodities,
allowing hamburger buns to be sold and not hamburgers, and exempting Sabbatarians who close on Saturday but forbidding them
from selling on Saturday the commodities exempted on Sunday. 4'
The court found the law "discriminatory, arbitrary and unreason42
able."
The equal protection clause was interpreted in McGowan and
Lee Optical Co. 43 to allow the state legislature great leeway in
35

Terry Carpenter, Inc. v. Wood, 177 Neb. 515, 519, 129 N.W.2d 475, 478

(1964).
36 Neb. Laws c. 392, § 3 (1963).
37 Neb. Laws c. 392, § 4 (1963).
38

"All persons are by nature free and independent, and have certain
inherent and inalienable rights; among these are life, liberty and the
pursuit of happiness. To secure these rights, and the protection of
property, governments are instituted among people, deriving their just
powers from the consent of the governed."

NEB. CONST. art. I, § 1.

39 "No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due
40

41
42

43

process of law." NEB. CONsT. art. I, § 3.
Terry Carpenter, Inc. v. Wood, 177 Neb. 515, 521, 129 N.W.2d 475, 479
(1964).
Id. at 523-25, 129 N.W.2d at 480-81.
Id. at 526, 129 N.W.2d at 481.

See note 18 supra. "The constitutional safeguard is offended only if
the classification rests on grounds wholly irrelevant to the achievement of the State's objective." McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420,

COMMENTS
setting up classifications, by giving a presumption of validity to
what the legislature might feel are classifications suitable to the
purpose of the law.
In a Sunday closing law, certain commodity exemptions are
required by human consumptive needs. The majority view which
follows McGowan is to allow the legislature to determine what
commodities are needed, and to provide for their sale so long as
the method bears a reasonable relationship to these commodities
and to the purpose of the legislation. For example, it is reasonable
to exempt small retail stores from general closing on the theory
that the goods they carry are generally those the public needs on
Sunday. A legislature might further feel that the small retail
business does not substantially abrogate the policy of eliminating
a
44
commercial atmosphere on Sunday. It was so held in McGowan.
Similarly, a legislature might feel that it is necessary to forbid
meat from being sold on Sunday, on the theory that meat handling
and packaging invites an undesirable industrial atmosphere much
more than allowing restaurants and drive-inns to stay open. On
the same theory, bread is not a commodity generally sold in restaurants, so it may be sold.
The Nebraska court held that both of these classifications violate the equal protection clause, giving no weight to legislative
determination.
Whether the purpose of the ordinance in, question be conformable
to the original purpose of such acts, to protect religious observance
of the Sabbath or that of the protection of society by establishing
a compulsory day of rest, it is not clear why the prohibition of the
sale of commodities is in furtherance of such purpose or object and
the prohibition of various permitted commercial activities is not.45
This was pointed out by Justice Carter in his concurring opinion:
The impracticability of classifying by the business or commodity
approach is almost insurmountable. ... . While I agree with the
majority opinion, it does not leave the impression, approved by
this court, that Sunday closing laws are proper subjects of legislation but, at the same time it strikes down the act on the basis of
discriminating classifications, when, proper classifications appear
to border on the impossible. 46
The apparent harsh* use of the equal protection test in the

44
45
46

425 (1961). The Nebraska test is similar. See Terry Carpenter, Inc.
v. Wood, 177 Neb. 515, 522, 129 N.W.2d 475, 479 (1964).
See note 1 supra.
Terry Carpenter, Inc. v. Wood, 177 Neb. 515, 524, 129 N.W.2d 475, 480
(1964).
Id. at 529-30, 129 N.W.2d at 483.
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Wood case may be attributed to two possible reasons: 1) a narrow
interpretation of the legislative purpose behind the Sunday closing
laws; and 2) failure of the United States Supreme Court to eliminate or satisfactorily explain away discriminatory religious-economic overtones in Sunday closing laws, and further, its failure to
define the nature of the state interest in creating them to convincingly eliminate the air of discrimination.
It is unclear from the opinion just exactly what the purpose of
the Sunday closing law is. The court's treatment of the retail exemption would indicate that it regards the law essentially as an
absolute prohibition of work on Sunday, and not as an attempt to
create a day of tranquility. Although both are causally related,
and the court has recognized the validity of the latter purpose, it
might have helped to specify in the statute that its purpose is to
create tranquility, and that exceptions are designed to provide
commodities to the public in a way least offensive to that pur47
pose.
The second reason for the court's rigid interpretation of the
equal protection test is suggested by the court's treatment of the
Sabbatarian exemption. To have been consistent with the ruling regarding the small retail exemption, any class exemption regardless
of its reasonable relation to the purposes of the law is violative of
equal protection. However, in dealing with the Sabbatarian exemption, the court did not say that the exemption was discriminatory
per se, as would have been consistent. The court instead accepted
the exemption as being proper, but held that the discrimination
was in prohibiting Sabbatarians from selling on Saturday the exempt goods permitted to be sold on Sunday. There is absolutely
no reasonable commercial connection between Sabbatarians working on Sunday and the commodities needed by the public, as there
was in the other unconstitutional classifications. Sabbatarian exempted businesses might very well disrupt community tranquility
and provide employment for thousands of workers.
After the Wood case, the Supreme Court of Nebraska had
reached the indefensible position of attempting to save the Sabbatarian exemption for reasons which reflect the religious overtones of Sunday legislation, while at the same time holding that a
commodity approach inherently discriminates because it differently
affects people similarly situated. The two attitudes could not coexist.
47

This uncertainty as to what the purpose of the legislature was has been

cleared up considerably by Skag-Way Dep't Stores, Inc. v. City of
Omaha, 179 Neb. 707, 140 N.W.2d 28 (1966).

COMMENTS
The problems in the Wood case were resolved in Skag-Way
Dep't Stores, Inc. v. City of Omaha.48 The majority opinion was
written by Justice Carter who had concurred in the result of the
Wood case, but who had pointed out that the Wood case left the
validity of Sunday legislation largely in doubt. In Skag-Way, two
Omaha city ordinances were challenged by the plaintiff. They
were far more discriminatory than the statute in the Wood case,
because they required that only two classes of businesses close on
Sunday: 1) those that had as their main purpose the selling of clothing, shoes, jewelry, ready to wear items and hardware, and 2) those
that sold groceries, fruits, vegetables and meat. 49 All other business and occupations were not covered by the ordinances, including
Sabbatarians who were exempted whether they otherwise fell
within the prohibition or not.50 Thus, no matter whether the
purpose of Sunday legislation is to require complete work-stoppage
or to provide a day of rest and tranquility, the classifications covered by the statute bore no reasonable relationship to either purpose.
The court held that the ordinances were not related to the
health, safety, peace and good order of society and, even if
they did so relate themselves, they are discriminatory as to those
...

in the same class." 51
In the Skag-Way case, the approach taken to the ordinances

forecasts the approach that will be taken to Sunday laws in the
future, and indicates a marked departure from the traditional
understanding of Sunday legislation enunciated in McGowan.
The classification of stores in accordance with commodities sold
no longer provides a proper method of classification because the
department store, chain store, and supermarket generally include
all of the goods formerly sold only in the 'community stores.' ...
[T]he meaningful economic changes and their effect on the reasonableness of classification require a fresh look at an old question
affected by these modern conditions.52
The court reaffirmed its position that Sunday legislation was
within the purview of state legislation,53 provided that the legislation itself does not proceed on a commodity approach, which re48

Ibid.

49 OMAHA, NFs., MmqicipAL CODE §§

19.12.010 and 19.24.010 (1959).

50 Skag-Way Dep't Stores, Inc. v. City of Omaha, 179 Neb. 707, 710-11,
140 N.W.2d 28, 31 (1966).
51 Id. at 713-14, 140 N.W.2d at 32.
52 Id. at 710-11, 140 N.W.2d at 31.
53 Id. at 713, 140 N.W.2d at 32.
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flects an attempt to discriminate among businesses. 54 To one reading Skag-Way in conjunction with the Wood case, which held business and commodity classifications invalid even though they were
somewhat related to the purpose of reducing the commercial atmosphere, the future of Sunday legislation in Nebraska seems dim,
unless it closes the door to classification problems by providing for
total closing.
The method with which the court treated the Sabbatarian exemption in Skag-Way eliminated the problem reached at this point
in the Wood case. "The ordinances before us indicate an intent to
promote religious considerations inherent in the provision permiting closing on Saturday by those who conscientiously observe Saturday as their Sabbath. But we do not place this decision on that
ground."", Presumably they could. But in light of the near impossibility of meeting the Supreme Court's requirements of equal
classification outside of, perhaps, total-closing, the inclusion of a
Sabbatarian exemption has little singular importance to the present
position of the court taken under the equal protection clause.
Thus, the Supreme Court of Nebraska has avoided the religious
issues under the first amendment by re-appraising Sunday legislation.
The difficulties of classification under modern conditions lead us
more in the direction of individual persuasion and private conscience as the proper solution of this complex problem. And it
might well be said that it is not the province of the state .

..

in

the exercise of its police power to invade the realm of private
conscience except where it is incidental to the proper exercise of
the police power. 56

The court inferred that if a Sunday closing law contained a Sabbatarian exemption, it might be struck down on the ground that it
carries religious considerations (which is clearly contrary to the
position taken in Braunfeld),57 but the court has not faced the
Another difficulty which will face legislative drafters attempting to
frame a Sunday closing law within the confines of the Wood and
Skag-Way cases is the proposition laid down that "harmless" merchandise cannot be prohibited from sale, while other merchandise in
the same class ("harmless") is allowed to be sold. Skag-Way Dep't
Stores, Inc. v. City of Omaha, 179 Neb. 707, 711, 713, 140 N.W.2d 28, 31,
32 (1966). Since most merchandise falls within this class, it is seemingly impossible to prohibit one item from sale without prohibiting
all items from sale to avoid the discrimination announced in Skag-Way.
55 Id. at 713, 140 N.W.2d at 32.
5G6Id. at 712, 140 N.W.2d at 31-32.
57 Braunfeld left the matter of whether a state might include a Sabbatarian exemption up to the states. Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599,
608-09 (1961).
54

COMMENTS
question of whether Sunday legislation without a Sabbatarian exemption violates the first amendment, and it is doubtful that it
soon will.
V. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court of Nebraska indicated in Skcg-Way that the
history of Sunday legislation has moved through three phases:
1) where closing laws were held valid on the theory that merely
promoting religious considerations alone advanced the state welfare
within the scope of the state police power, 2) where they would be
invalidated if the sole purpose were to advance religious interests
(McGowan), and 3) where they are invalid as a discriminatory tool
to protect certain business interests. 58 If the closing laws are to be
considered economic regulations aimed at protecting down-town
stores, it is doubtful that the United States Supreme Court will
interfere with the state's interpretations under the present constitutional test of "invidious discrimination," but it remains for the
Supreme Court to answer the questions raised under the first
amendment, aside from any given state-held position regarding the
purpose of the law. The position taken by the Nebraska court
clearly indicates that other considerations ought to be taken into
account aside from those enumerated by the Supreme Court in arriving at the conclusion that Sunday legislation is of great state
interest. It is submitted that the susceptibility of Sunday legislation to commercial misuse and discrimination to protect certain
business interests detracts greatly from the importance of Sunday
legislation, and this ought to move the balance toward greater
protection of religious minorities.
Richard A. Speliman '67
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Skag-Way Dep't Stores, Inc. v. City of Omaha, 179 Neb. 707, 710, 140
N.W.2d 28, 31 (1966).

